Excuse the ""s, but I'm still not convinced we should be calling the ousting of Akaev in Kyrgyzstan on March 24 a revolution. OK, in the broadest sense of the word
as the OED defines it (definition 7a) it was, but, even then we hit a slight snag in terms of what is meant by 'complete' and 'state'. Commentators on the ground, such as ICG's staff in Bishkek and Osh and IFES's
David Mikosz (who has run the
Kyrgyz Elections Yahoo Groups e-list in commendable fashion and continues to do so), have been keen to point out that it was
more a case of state collapse that left the opposition (cohesive only in terms of a collective name) to pick up the pieces, or at least try and hold them together. This was not Georgia or Ukraine, with an extensive and organised opposition and wide public support and foreign funding. This was far more spontaneous, unexpected and fragmented. More to the point, there was no "then what do we do?" planning from opposition leaders, a fact that has been reflected in developments after Akaev and his family fled and the White House was stormed.
So, what sort of interpretations have there been? Well, everything from pro-Western naiveity on how democratic it all was and isn't that wonderful, to pro-Russian this is a Western effort to threaten Russia, and anything and everything inbetween, as well as a
certain sense of disquiet about the implications for US foreign policy.
Taking a quick step back, for a review of events of March 24 the following sites are useful:
- Gazeta.ru very helpfully ran a page with as-it-happens updates on events, starting the week or so with the seizing of government buildings in Osh and the growing protests and running on from there (and still being updated, albeit intermittently). The major downside of this page is that while the times are shown, the date isn't, and the whole thing is a backwards chronology (most recent first), making a slightly confusing reading if you're not already very up on what happened when. If you print this, make sure you've get enough paper - it'll be about 72 sides...
- For a more immediate impression, I collected photos of protests before the 24th, the 24th and the aftermath that are in a number of online albums available here.
- Kel-Kel's site (not the pro-government clone - Clone site here in theory, but may have been taken down) has various posts and information, as does Akaevu.net.
- The usual suspects - Eurasianet, Registan.net, Centrasia.ru, Gazeta.kg have a lot of background and updates, or probably the easiest way to get an overview is to Google an obvious combination of words (like "protest" + "election" + "Kyrgyzstan") in English or Russian or Kyrgyz or possibly even Uzbek depending on what linguistic acrobatics you're capable of(internet glocalisation in action with Google at your service...).
Back to the analysis bit, after that very brief recap (or at least, how to recap).
A few questions for consideration:
- Why now?
- Who lead the demonstrators?
- How planned/organised was the 'revolution'?
- What was the role/significance of foreign powers and/or NGOs?
- Were there demands beyond the observance of democratic outcomes?
- Is there a link between economic hardship and political demands?
- Why did Akaev give in so easily (and non-violently)?
So, to take it from the top, so to speak, and with blatant disregard for grammar:
1. Why now? - Big mistake on Akav's part in reforming the parliament, the Zhogorku Kenesh, from a bicameral 105-seat system to a unicameral 75-seat system with deputies elected from single mandate constituencies. This effectively individualised politics, made sure that at least some of Akaev's allies would get left out (reduced number of seats and having to resign government post if running) and created a way for Akaev to observe the constitutional requirement that he step down at the Presidental elections (scheduled at this point for later 2005) but maintain power by becoming Prime Minister, since the reform shifted the balance of power to the benefit of this position. Continued alienation of allies, both political and personal meant that his support base was dwindling even before public unrest was factored in (for example asking allied not to stand so that relatives can - cf. Jeenbekov in Talas constituency). Not addressing original protests when certain candidates were disqualified from running on very dubious grounds, and carrying on regardless. Being completely and utterly surprised by the outrage caused by newpaper exposes [can't find the accent key] about his and his family's wealth (so, one could argue that he wasn't authoritarian enough in terms of exerting media control...) and basically underestimating public feeling that was made far more mobile by the personal nature of the parliamentary campaigns, since it was now a personal matter, not just a political one to support one's chosen candidate. And while he may not have underestimated the opposition's divided nature, he certainly underestimated their strength and potential to mobilise people.
2. Who led the demonstrators? Good question that. Depends on when and where. Despite the prominence of the formal opposition leaders - Bakiev, Otunbaeva, Beknazarov, Tekebaev, Sadyrbaev and Asanov - many of the demonstrations depended on local figures for mobilisation and were rooted in local causes (supporters of deregistered candidates). Regarding events on March 24, although opposition leaders (Bakiev, Otunbaeva and Beknazarov) had agreed on a major rally in Bishkek drawing on various groups of supporters (ICG lists the following affiliations: supporters of Bakiev, Sydykov and Beknazarov, activists from the south with Otunbaeva, Jeenbekov's supporters from Talas, Japarov's from Kochkor, supporters of Atambaev and Eshimkanov from nearby towns, bazaar workers (many southerners), youth groups such as KelKel and "urban residents mobilised by Nazaraliev's appeals for support" (p. 8).) The rally was largely peaceful despite a large police presence. The arrival of protestors from Osh, who continued on to the White House rather than joining the main rally appears to have been a turning point, particularly since many young people joined them. There were then clashes between this group, especially the youths, and riot police, who after two attempts to repel the protestors, fled, opening the way for the White House to be stormed. Opposition leaders arrived after this and tried to take control, appealing for calm (Bakiev). Later in the day Kulov was released from gaol and intervened, taking control of the security forces for several days before stepping down.
3. How planned/organised was the 'revolution'? In short, not very. Certainly not very controlled, and that fact is still evident now, particularly with many of the interim govt. jostling for position as presidential candidates. Strikes me as a bit like the collapse of the USSR - events overtook people, leaving them to try and stay afloat while it all happens and then try and make sense of it. Certianly, there is much to suggest that opposition figures' cooperation was more convenience than a foundation for anything long lasting, and in light of the frequently colourful cast of characters who played parts in events upto the 24th, it was more like a runaway snowball than planned revolution as in Ukraine, for example.
4. Foreign powers/NGOs? A distinction here needs to be made between local and international NGOs. Local NGOs often got overshadowed by GONGOs, which were inevitably pro-govt. Furthermore, the government wasn't adverse to creating NGOs to suit its purpose such as the KelKel clone. This extended to creating international election observing agencies after the first round of voting (e.g. the London International Institute for Democracy). It is generally thought that neither international NGOs nor foreign funding helped the opposition significantly, and certainly, despite vocal allegations from Akaev during the election campaign, there is no evidence that they received direct foreign funding. This is not to say that the numerous foreign-funded civil society projects didn't play a background role however (article on Freedom House in Kyrgyzstan), and US Ambassador Stephen Young certainly copped it for offering support when the electricity to Bishkek's only independent publishing house was cut in the form of generators and just for making statements supporting free elections, earning himself a rebuke from the Kyrgyz government for meddling in domestic affairs - press conference transcript from March 16 here. There is evidence that various NGOs had links with pro-revolution groups in Ukraine - Birge! being a case in point - but the idea of such groups having much influence over events is doubtful.
5. Were there demands beyond the observance of democratic outcomes? Yep, at all stages. In actual fact there was very little democratic about the protests, with people basically wanting to get their own way and refusing to accept verdicts (e.g. the eventual eviction of disqualified candidates from the Supreme Court in Bishkek last Wednesday who had occupied the building at the end of April and who are now protesting elsewhere...). Demands grew out of support for local candidates to demand the resignation of local governors and officials, and then on to demanding Akaev's resignation and even his overthrow. People's realissation they didn't have to be complicit with the regime. Examples of voting to ensure reruns of elections - using the system, rather than bypassing it.
6. Is there a link between economic hardship and political demands? Yes, but only on a background level. This is more going to be a factor in the aftermath in terms of the interim govt.'s ability to maintain support, a factor they have recognised. More anger at the Akaevs' wealth. Regional aspect in sense that south more political and also poorer, greater sense of disenchantment due to greater political and economic disenfranchisement. Need to bear in mind 'patronage' system - people would often support a candidate due to what they could provide directly in material terms. Reports of vote-buying (literally), as well as people being paid to protest - reflected in unofficial campaign cost estimates. Involvement of businessmen - will support whoever best represents their interests, dangers of criminal links.
7. Why did Akaev give in so easily (and non-violently)? This is at least to Akaev's credit, in some ways, though it is doubtful that he had sufficient support from the army or police to go through with an attempt to confront protestors violently. Memories of the Aksu tragedy in 2002 when several people were shot dead by police (incidentally causing now-acting President Bakiev, who was then Prime Minister, and his government to resign). Akaev seemed genuinely shocked about the strength of feeling against him by all accounts, and had made his position untenable by alienating even his own supporters. Underestimation of opposition's potential and power, despite fragmentation. Risk of worsening the situation and causing further violence (worst case scenario civil war) if he tried to stay, especially in light of regional and clan divisions.
All comments, ideas, questions welcome.
